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Abstract 
The applicability of Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1986, 1989) States of Mind (SOM) model for assessing 
the influence of cognitive-behavioral therapy on cognitive functioning was evaluated with social 
phobics. The SOM model states that a positive dialogue (i.e., a 2:1 ratio of positive to negative 
thoughts) is optimal for effective coping. Social phobics receiving either a cognitive-behavioral or 
educational-supportive group treatment were compared for SOM change, as were subjects meeting 
criteria for improvement or nonimprovement. Also the study compared the predictability of the 
SOM ratio with a ratio based on percent of negative thoughts. Subjects in both treatments evidenced 
negative monologue (i.e., a preponderance of negative thoughts) at pretreatment. A significant Treat-
ment × Time interaction showed that, although the groups did not differ at posttreatment, those in 
the cognitive treatment reached positive dialogue at a 6-month follow-up while the other group did 
not. Improvers also attained positive dialogue at follow-up while nonimprovers did not. The SOM 
and the negative thought ratios performed similarly in predicting most outcome measures, suggest-
ing that neutral thoughts (the only distinction between the two) serve little function for persons with 
problems of social phobia. 
 
Keywords: cognitive assessment, cognitive treatment, states of mind, thought-listing, social phobia 
 
Despite a burgeoning interest in cognitive-behavioral treatments in the last decade (Ken-
dall & Hollon, 1979), little is known about how cognitive processes change as a result of 
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psychotherapy. This problem is particularly vexing for researchers who design interven-
tions to alter dysfunctional cognitive responses but are often unable to adequately test 
these hypothesized treatment mechanisms. Prior research has been limited by the lack of 
adequate cognitive assessment techniques. However, a more critical issue is the absence of 
empirically testable models that describe how cognitive processes are influenced by psy-
chotherapy. 
An exception to this situation is Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1986, 1989) States of Mind 
(SOM) model, which emphasizes the relative balance of positive and negative cognition in 
psychopathology. Based on the golden section hypothesis, the model proposes that opti-
mal cognitive functioning consists of a ratio of positive to the sum of positive and negative 
thoughts that approaches 0.618, or the golden section proportion. This asymmetrical bal-
ance of positive and negative thoughts is said to render negative events salient but not 
overwhelming, thus enabling one to cope with stress (Berlyne, 1971). 
Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1986, 1989) model defines five different states of mind, each 
characterized by different values of the SOM ratio of P/(P + N). Three SOMs involve an 
internal dialogue because, as Schwartz and Garamoni (1989, p. 275) state, “they capture 
the dialectical interaction between positive and negative thoughts.” The first of these dia-
logic SOMs is positive dialogue, with a “set point” of 0.618. This SOM has a possible range 
of 0.56 to 0.68, and, as previously mentioned, is hypothesized as being optimal for coping 
with stress. The second SOM is the internal dialogue of conflict, with a set point of 0.50 and 
a range of 0.45 to 0.55, and is associated with mild levels of psychopathology. The third 
SOM is negative dialogue, with a set point of 0.38 and a range of 0.32 to 0.44, and is associated 
with the moderate degree of pathology that may characterize many clinical samples of 
depressed or anxious persons. 
The use of a set point to define these SOMs is premised on the notion that people mon-
itor their thoughts relative to some fixed value, and when discrepancies occur, coping pro-
cesses are initiated to restore some form of balance. Consequently, functional individuals 
are hypothesized to strive to maintain a set point that approaches the positive dialogue 
proportion of 0.618, while substantial deviations in either direction from this set point rep-
resent increasing degrees of psychopathology. 
The final two SOMs do not have specific set points because either positive or negative 
cognition predominate, such that any dialectic process is relatively absent or reduced. The 
SOM of positive monologue involves values ranging from 0.69 to 1.00, and is characterized 
by insufficient attention to negative events that may signal important threats and serve a 
motivational function. This SOM ratio may be related to pathological states like acute ma-
nia. The SOM of negative monologue involves values ranging from 0.31 to 0.00 and, because 
it is characterized by extreme negativity, is believed to be associated with severe pathology 
as manifested in profound depression or acute stages of a severe panic disorder. 
Empirical evaluation of the SOM model is just beginning. Reanalysis of previously pub-
lished assessment studies has shown that samples attain SOM ratios consistent with the 
model’s predictions of SOM set points for varying degrees of pathology. Also, in these 
reanalyses (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986, 1989), results from five treatment studies revealed 
that all pretreatment SOMs were in the internal dialogue of conflict, negative dialogue, or 
negative monologue categories. However, at posttreatment assessment, two-thirds of the 
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groups evidenced SOMs that fell within the positive dialogue range, while the remaining 
one-third fell within the internal dialogue of conflict category. 
Although Schwartz and Garamoni suggest that participation in therapy is associated 
with a shift toward the SOM of positive dialogue, Schwartz and Michelson (1987) con-
ducted a more extensive analysis of how treatment process and outcome covary with 
change in SOM. They found that the SOM ratio for a sample of agoraphobics participating 
in one of four types of cognitive or behavioral treatments shifted to the positive dialogue 
range by midtreatment and, generally, remained at this SOM level throughout a 3-month 
follow-up. Also, when subjects were classified for improvement and endstate functioning, 
high-functioning and improved subjects both evidenced SOM ratios in the upper end of 
positive dialogue or lower end of positive monologue from midtreatment to follow-up. In 
contrast, low-functioning and nonimproving subjects progressed only to the internal dia-
logue of conflict category and generally remained in this SOM through follow-up. 
Schwartz and Michelson’s (1987) results were generally consistent with the SOM model. 
However, the paucity of studies examining the SOM model relative to therapy outcome 
limits our knowledge of the generalizability of Schwartz and Michelson’s findings for 
other clinical disorders and treatments. Consequently, the first purpose of the present 
study was to replicate several tenets of the SOM model tested by Schwartz and Michelson. 
These questions included: (a) Do patients begin treatment with dysfunctional SOMs? (b) Do 
they shift to functional SOM levels at posttreatment? (c) Likewise, do patients who im-
prove shift to functional SOMs at posttreatment and follow-up? (d) Finally, does exposure 
to a cognitively oriented treatment produce a more stable shift in SOM level than exposure 
to a noncognitive treatment? 
The second purpose was to provide further comparative data regarding the validity of 
the SOM model. In a recent study, Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck (1990) compared 
the SOM model to Kendall and Hollon’s (1981) “power-of-nonnegative-thinking” model 
in predicting anxiety and performance responses of social phobic patients. The latter 
model suggests the use of a ratio that differs from the SOM ratio only in the inclusion of 
neutral thoughts in the denominator of the following ratio: N(P + N + Ne = total). The two 
ratios were equally predictive of criterion measures, suggesting that neutral thoughts may 
contribute little to the internal dialogue of persons with problems of social phobia. 
Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck (1990) also evaluated Schwartz and Garamoni’s 
(1989) contention that the SOM ratio is unaffected by the method of cognitive assessment 
(e.g., endorsement vs. thought listing). They found that the endorsement method was less 
likely to classify patients in the more pathological SOM categories than thought-listing. 
However, since the thought-listing assessment followed exposure to a phobic situation 
while the endorsement measure was part of a questionnaire packet, stress of the exposure 
may have temporarily induced a lower SOM, as discussed by Schwartz and Garamoni 
(1989). This finding does not imply that thought-listing is less valid but only that any as-
sessment collected after an exposure experience may be more responsive to greater 
arousal. In Schwartz and Michelson’s (1987) study, SOM data were collected during a 
think-aloud procedure in which verbalizations of thoughts were audiotaped during a 1-mile 
walk. The present study used a thought-listing procedure as in Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, 
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and Dombeck (1990) and provides a further evaluation of the effect of different assessment 





Subjects in this study were 11 women and 19 men aged 21 to 44 (M = 30.5), who completed 
all pretreatment, posttreatment, and 6-month follow-up assessment measures at the Pho-
bia and Anxiety Disorders Clinic, University at Albany, State University of New York. 
These 30 subjects completed all phases of a comparative treatment study for social phobia 
reported by Heimberg, Dodge, et al. (1990). Four additional subjects were dropped because 
of missing data on several measures. Sixteen subjects reported social interaction as their 
primary fear, while 14 subjects reported fears in performance-related situations such as 
public speaking or working while being observed. Eighteen subjects (60%) had completed 
college, 19 (63%) were currently employed, and 20 (67%) had never been married. 
All subjects were screened with the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS; Di-
Nardo, O’Brien, Barlow, Waddell, & Blanchard, 1983) or the ADIS-R (Barlow, 1985), and 
received a primary diagnosis of social phobia according to DSM-III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) or DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria. Infor-
mation on the ADIS procedure, its reliability, and on other exclusion criteria may be found 
in Heimberg, Dodge, et al. (1990). Subjects were also rated on the Phobic Severity Rating 
Scale developed by Watson and Marks (1971), and only those receiving a rating of 4 (i.e., 
moderate impairment) or greater on this 9-point scale were included in the treatment study 
(M = 5.57, SD = 1.15). 
 
Procedures and Treatment Conditions 
As described in Heimberg, Dodge, et al. (1990), subjects were assigned randomly to either 
a cognitive-behavior group treatment (CBGT) package (n = 14) or an educational-supportive 
therapy (ES) group (n = 16). Groups met weekly for twelve 2-hour sessions, with 4–7 subjects 
per group, and were conducted by a male-female cotherapist team. Therapists included 
one PhD clinical psychologist and five advanced doctoral students in clinical psychology. 
The PhD served as a cotherapist for two groups in each treatment condition and supervisor 
for the rest. Further information about therapist training and monitoring of treatment cred-
ibility may be found in Heimberg, Dodge, et al. (1990). CBGT consisted of cognitive re-
structuring (i.e., teaching clients to identify, analyze, and dispute dysfunctional thoughts), 
exposure to simulated phobic situations, and homework assignments for in vivo exposure. 
ES combined educational presentations and supportive group psychotherapy. In the first 
half of a session, a lecture-discussion format was used to present topics of relevance to 
social phobia, while in the second half group members shared concerns about upcoming 
anxiety-provoking events and were given homework assignments. ES was devised as a 
credible placebo condition for the evaluation of CBGT, and in fact, the two treatments were 
rated as equally credible (Heimberg, Dodge, et al., 1990). 
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Assessment 
Two weeks prior to treatment, at posttreatment, and at a 6-month follow-up, subjects com-
pleted a battery of self-report measures, engaged in an individualized behavioral simulation 
of an anxiety-provoking situation, and received clinician ratings following a semistruc-
tured interview. The behavioral simulation was a behavioral role-play involving a situa-
tion that typically evoked high levels of social anxiety for the individual subject. 
 
Thought-Listing 
Cognitive responses to the behavioral simulation were assessed with the thought-listing 
procedure used previously with socially anxious college students (Cacioppo, Glass, & Mer-
luzzi, 1979; Heimberg, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987). Immediately following the simulation, 
subjects were given prepared forms and asked to record the thoughts they experienced 
about the situation. Trained raters independently categorized thoughts as positive (facili-
tating relaxed and effective performance), negative (hindering relaxed and effective func-
tioning), or neutral (unclassifiable). Heimberg, Dodge, et al. (1990) report interrater 
agreement values (Cohen’s kappas) for a subsample of subjects as κ = .79 for positive 
thoughts and κ = .93 for negative thoughts. 
 
Improvement1 
As previously mentioned, Watson and Marks’ (1971) Phobic Severity Rating Scale (PSR) 
was administered at pretreatment screening, and this rating was repeated at posttreatment 
and follow-up by an independent clinician. Improver (n = 18) and nonimprover (n = 11) status 
was based on PSR ratings, and improvement was defined as (a) a decrease of at least 2 
rating points and (b) posttreatment and follow-up ratings that were both below 4 (i.e., the 
level defined as clinically impaired). 
 
Outcome Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory scores (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 
and subjects’ subjective report of anxiety prior to and during the behavioral simulation 
served as outcome criteria to be predicted by SOM and percent negative thoughts scores. 
Subjects reported their subjective anxiety, both during the anticipatory period (3 min prior) 
and during the performance period of the behavioral simulation, on a 0–100 Subjective 
Units of Discomfort Scale (SUDS). Subjects were prompted for ratings at 1-minute inter-
vals, resulting in three SUDS ratings for the anticipatory phase and five SUDS ratings for 
the performance phase. Individual ratings were averaged within these two periods when 
calculating correlations with the cognitive ratio scores. 
 
Calculation of SOM and Percent Negative Thoughts Ratios 
The formula for the SOM ratio was P/(P + N), while the formula for the percent negative 
thoughts ratio was N/(P + N + Ne). However, Amsel and Fichten (1990) have argued that 
calculation of ratios based on these raw frequencies may lead to spurious results because 
of problems created by zero frequencies of positive or negative thoughts. For example, an 
individual’s SOM ratio will always have a value of 0 when the frequency of positive 
thoughts is 0, regardless of the number of negative thoughts, and a value of 1 when there 
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are no negative thoughts, regardless of the number of positive thoughts. Amsel and Fichten 
(1990) provide evidence suggesting that a constant of 1.0 added to the frequency of positive 
or negative thoughts when either (but not both) of these values is 0 produces results most 
comparable to those of uncorrected scores. Although their evidence was based on a sample 
of undergraduates, Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck’s (1990) results with social pho-
bics corroborated this finding. Thus, a constant of 1.0 was added, when necessary, in cal-




Because the data were in the form of proportions, subjects’ SOM and percent of negative 
thought scores were submitted to an arcsine transformation prior to conducting all anal-
yses. Also, a multivariate analysis of variance comparing treatment groups on pretreat-
ment SOM, percent negative thoughts, BDI, and SUDS scores yielded no significant group 
differences. 
 
Change in SOM Due to Treatment 
The current sample of social phobics attained a pretreatment SOM of 0.287 (SD = 0.13), 
placing them in the negative monologue category. To assess the effects of treatment on the 
level and temporal pattern of SOMs, a 2 (Treatment) × 2 (Time, i.e., posttreatment and fol-
low-up) repeated-measures analysis of covariance was computed. Pretreatment SOM ratio 
served as the covariate. 
There was no significant main effect for either treatment or time. There was, however, 
a significant, F(1, 28) = 6.03, p < .02, Treatment × Time interaction. As shown in Figure 1, 
tests of simple main effects revealed that the treatment groups did not differ in SOM at 
posttreatment, F < 1, but did differ, F(1, 28) = 9.34, p < .01, at 6-month follow-up. This dif-
ference was due to the ES group’s shift from a posttreatment SOM of internal dialogue of 
conflict to a 6-month follow-up SOM of negative monologue. In contrast, the CBGT group 
progressed from aa posttreatment SOM of internal dialogue of conflict to a 6-month 
follow-up SOM of positive dialogue. Thus the treatment containing explicit cognitive com-
ponents appears to have fostered patients’ continued use of more adaptive self-statement 
processes following cessation of group sessions. 
A 2 (Improver vs. Nonimprover) × 2 (Time) repeated-measures analysis of covariance 
was computed to evaluate the association between SOM level and improvement status. 
This analysis yielded only a significant main effect for improvement status, F(1, 26) = 8.20, 
p < .01, but no effect for time F(1, 27) = 2.87, n.s., and no interaction, F(1, 27) = 1.72, n.s. 
Subjects who met criteria for improvement evidenced on the average higher SOM ratios at 
the posttreatment and 6-month follow-up assessments. In fact, while improvers’ pretreat-
ment SOM of 0.297 placed them in the negative monologue range, their posttreatment and 
6-month follow-up SOM ratios (adjusted means of 0.631 and 0.666, respectively) placed 
them in the optimal SOM category of positive dialogue. 
  




Figure 1. States of mind (SOM) trajectories based on adjusted means for the cognitive-
behavioral group treatment (CBGT) and educational supportive group treatment (ES) 
across assessment phases. Solid lines indicate upper and lower limits of the SOM ranges 
and dotted lines indicate SOM set points. 
 
Comparison of SOM and Percent Negative Thoughts Ratios 
Similar 2 × 2 repeated-measures analyses of covariance were performed on the negative 
thoughts ratios to compare the sensitivity of this index to the SOM ratio. Results for the 
treatment analysis (i.e., CBGT vs. ES) yielded no significant effects. Consequently, this 
measure was not as sensitive as the SOM ratio in detecting the enhanced maintenance of 
positive thinking associated with participation in CBGT. 
In contrast, results for the relation of improvement status to cognitive functioning 
yielded a significant main effect for improvement, F(1, 26) = 6.04, p < .05, but no significant 
effect for time and no significant Improvement × Time interaction. This finding shows that 
subjects who met criteria for improvement evidenced a lower percentage of negative thoughts 
at the posttreatment and 6-month follow-up assessments. 
 
Correlations with Outcome Measures 
Zero-order correlations between SOM and percent negative thoughts ratios and treatment 
outcome measures are presented in Table I. Although the Phobic Severity Rating was used 
previously to categorize patients as improved/nonimproved, it is included here to directly 
examine the magnitude of its covariation with the cognitive measures. 
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Inspection of Table I shows that neither cognitive index was significantly related to these 
outcome measures at pretreatment assessment, a possible artifact of restricted range. At 
posttreatment both the SOM and percent of negative thoughts ratios were significantly 
associated with self-report of depression, subjective report of anxiety (SUDS-P) during the 
behavioral simulation, and the independent clinician’s rating of impairment. This pattern 
was reproduced in most respects at the follow-up assessment except that no correlation 
was found with the BDI. However, t tests for differences between dependent correlations 
revealed that the coefficients for percent of negative thoughts and the two SUDS ratings at 
follow-up were significantly greater (both p < .05) than the corresponding SOM coefficients. 
Although the latter finding was unexpected, the general pattern of the results suggests that 
the SOM ratio was as sensitive in predicting the outcome criteria as a previously existing 
index. This result should not be surprising because, similarly to Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, 
and Dombeck (1990), the SOM and percent negative thought ratios in the present study 
were highly correlated at all three assessment points (i.e., r ranged from –.82 to –.85, p < .001). 
 
Table I. Comparison of Correlations between SOM Ratio, Percent Negative Thought Ratio, and 
Outcome Measuresa 
 Pretreatment  Posttreatment  Follow-up 
 SOM PNT  SOM PNT  SOM PNT 
Measure ratio ratio  ratio ratio  ratio ratio 
BDI –.20 .23  –.38b .39b  .00 .13 
SUDS-A .03 –.12  –.27 .24  –.23 .43b 
SUDS-P –.28 .19  –.37b .41b  –.34b .53c 
Phobic Severity Rating –.19 .09  –.42b .35b  –.44b .48c 
a. Note: SOM = states of mind, PNT = percent negative thoughts, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, SUDS-
A = Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale-Anticipatory, and SUDS-P = Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale-
Performance 
b. p < .05 




The purpose of the present research was to conduct additional tests of the applicability of 
the SOM model for charting changes in cognitive functioning due to participation in psy-
chotherapy. The present sample of social phobics engaged in negative monologue (0.287) 
prior to treatment, achieved the internal dialogue of conflict level at posttreatment, and, 
depending on treatment condition, progressed to positive dialogue (i.e., CBGT) or slipped 
back to negative monologue (i.e., ES) at a 6-month follow-up assessment. Despite the 
greater degree of pretreatment negative thinking in our subjects as compared to Schwartz 
and Michelson’s (1987) subjects (M = 0.437), the trajectory of cognitive change in both stud-
ies was similar, in that treated groups fell within the positive dialogue category at follow-
up. The similar trajectory in both studies is consistent with the SOM model’s premise that 
individuals monitor their thoughts and strive to maintain a balance of positive and nega-
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tive elements that approximates the positive dialogue setpoint. However, whether the pre-
treatment SOM differences between the two studies are because of sample fluctuations, 
client factors (e.g., diagnosis, co-morbidity), or different assessment methods cannot be 
answered by the present data. 
Findings from this study extend previous research by showing that a treatment that 
explicitly emphasizes cognitive aspects of anxiety and cognitive coping responses (i.e., 
CBGT) was able to sustain and augment increased positive thinking at the time of follow-
up. The fact that CBGT subjects attained a follow-up SOM of 0.667, placing them in the 
upper range of positive dialogue, may suggest a specificity effect. In other words, the sig-
nificant interaction suggests that continued practice of cognitive skills leads to a greater 
preponderance of positive thoughts occurring in subsequent exposures to phobic situa-
tions. The credible comparison treatment (ES) failed to sustain any initial gains in subjects’ 
degree of positive thinking. The fact that there was no main effect but only an interaction 
for treatment, suggests that although the ES treatment increased clients’ enthusiasm, the 
absence of explicit coping skills to use once treatment was over resulted in a return to more 
dysfunctional cognition. Hence, unless a treatment targets a particular dimension that is 
salient to a client’s problem, the SOM ratio may revert to its pretreatment level. 
Analysis of the relationship between improvement status and SOM yielded only a sig-
nificant main effect. Since improvers attained a posttreatment SOM of positive dialogue 
and then maintained this SOM at follow-up, the present results support Schwartz and Gar-
amoni’s (1986, 1989) contention that positive dialogue is optimal because of the infor-
mation-processing properties of positive asymmetry. With the almost 2:1 ratio of positive 
to negative thoughts, the individual’s appraisal of internal and external events should en-
able the person to remain focused on ways in which to cope with situations. Also, the sig-
nificant inverse correlations between the SOM ratio and a relative index of improvement 
(i.e., Phobic Severity Rating) suggests that cognitive change is not just “inside the head” 
since severity ratings were made by clinicians not involved in the administration of treat-
ment. 
Although only correlational, the relationship between SOMs and the BDI and SUDS 
suggests that greater degrees of positive asymmetry relate to less fearful and pessimistic 
perceptions. More research is necessary, however, to describe the pattern of relationships 
between the SOM ratio and various outcome criteria, given the evidence for desynchrony 
among measures of anxiety’s triple response channels (Nietzel, Bernstein, & Rossell, 1989). 
Another purpose of the present study was to compare the utility of the SOM and percent 
of negative thoughts ratios in their roles as either predictor or criterion variables. Heim-
berg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck (1990) and the present research are the only studies to 
have directly compared these two approaches. The percent of negative thoughts ratio was 
derived from the assumption that negatively biased cognition has a greater effect on cop-
ing and adjustment than positive cognition (Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Results from the pre-
sent study demonstrate that the two ratios are highly correlated and that both showed a 
similar pattern of covariation with other variables. The two exceptions to this pattern were 
that treatment condition influenced change in the SOM but not percent of negative thoughts 
and that percent of negative thoughts compared to SOM correlated more substantially with 
SUDS ratings at follow-up. In combination with Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck’s 
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(1990) data, the present findings suggest that the neutral thoughts score, which is the only 
substantive difference between the two ratios, contributes little additional information to 
our understanding of the internal dialogue of social phobics. 
Given the more extensive theoretical underpinnings of the SOM model with its empha-
sis on “relative balance,” it appears that this model possesses great explanatory power. 
Nevertheless, future research should address the degree to which SOM findings generalize 
across different assessment procedures. Presently the cognitive assessment literature pro-
vides a mixed picture of the generalizability of results across assessment methods. Both 
Clark’s (1988) literature review and Fichten, Amsel, and Robillard’s (1988) multiple studies 
of though frequencies showed few differences between the results produced by endorse-
ment vs. thought-listing methods. In contrast, Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, and Dombeck (1990) 
found differences in classification of subjects in SOM categories depending on whether the 
SOM ratio was based on an endorsement or thought-listing procedure. Also, the differ-
ences noted between the mean pretreatment SOMs of Schwartz and Michelson’s (19887) 
subjects and those in the present study suggest that the think-aloud method may charac-
terize clinical subjects as less dysfunctional than would a thought-listing method. Conse-
quently, it is important in evaluating the SOM model that future research compare 
multiple methods of assessment within the same study. 
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1. Total N for this analysis was 29 because one subject could not be scheduled for the 6-month 
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